Post 4

For me, at least, it seems there is a substantial link between the first issue we we're asked to direct out attention towards in this post and the third issue.  Giving some depth and definition to the pragmatist notion of truth appears to be at the forefront of James' concerns and intentions, particularly in the "What Pragmatism Means" essay.  Pragmatism distances itself from other branches of philosophy most radically in it's dealings with the meaning of "truth" and all that it implies.  

Truth is such a deeply rooted and essential question in philosophy.  What is true?  How do we establish truth?  If one uncovers what they believe to be a finite and fixed truth, what are the greater implications of that truth?  Pragmatism seems no less concerned with this concept than any other philosophy.  The difference is, perhaps, that instead of trying to establish a finite truth, the pragmatic focus not in uncovering conceptual truths, but tackling (and to some extent, dismantling) the entire system of determining truth altogether.

There is a great deal of validity to this objective, particularly when one considers on how many occasions a thinker has posited the validity of an argument or conclusion (especially one we find incredibly problematic), as an absolute truth.  Pragmatism seeks to put an end to the practice of unwaveringly confident thinkers laying down ideas and notions as finite and absolute truths, by giving us a more practical definition of this word.  From a certain standpoint, there is something both incredibly comforting and yet, highly problematic in this endeavor.

The comfort comes in the idea finally, human knowledge is being given the veil of doubt and fallibility it truly deserves.  Perhaps we can't know anything for certain and it seems arrogant to assume that, as James put it, our "man-made language, conceptual shorthand" can ever be unquestionably correct. 

 At the same time, however, if truth is only a convenient term applied to certain ideas, which, in time may reveal themselves to have lesser truth value than we originally assumed, then why bother with the term at all?  If truth isn't truth then, well, what's the point of truth?  I find the James essays most troubling because it seems that he carries some campaigns within the pragmatism school to an unsettling extreme, where we almost risk simply losing the purpose of certain notions altogether.  Perhaps it's simply a quibble of language that I have with James' argument, but still I feel that there's something inherently a) dangerous or b) pointless, in his attempt to define, or rather un-define, the meaning of truth.  The practical purpose of questioning truths seems far less relevant when we've reached a point where nothing can be looked upon as firm, concrete, or substantial.  And yet, James' dismisses the abstractions of rationalists as entirely, a move which  I feel (given what he himself is trying to accomplish), is slightly obtuse if not completely unnecessary.